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Abstract
Purpose Persecutory delusions are a central psychotic
experience, at the severe end of a paranoia spectrum in the
general population. The aim of the review is to provide an
introduction to the understanding of persecutory delusions,
highlight key putative causal factors that have the potential
to be translated into efficacious treatment, and indicate
future research directions.
Methods A narrative literature review was undertaken to
highlight the main recent areas of empirical study con-
cerning non-clinical and clinical paranoia.
Results Six main proximal causal factors are identified: a
worry thinking style, negative beliefs about the self,
interpersonal sensitivity, sleep disturbance, anomalous
internal experience, and reasoning biases. Each has plau-
sible mechanistic links to the occurrence of paranoia.
These causal factors may be influenced by a number of
social circumstances, including adverse events, illicit drug
use, and urban environments.
Conclusions There have been numerous replicated
empirical findings leading to a significant advance in the
understanding of persecutory delusions, now beginning to
be translated into cognitive treatments. The first trials
specifically focussed on patients who have persecutory
delusions in the context of psychotic diagnoses are occur-
ring. Initial evidence of efficacy is very promising.
Keywords Delusions  Persecutory  Schizophrenia 
Psychosis  Paranoia
Introduction
‘My neighbours are spreading nasty rumours and are
tormenting me’
‘MI5, MOSSAD, and the police are trying to get me
and torture me’
‘An evil spirit is out to kill me’ [1]
Two distressing concerns are at the heart of persecutory
delusions: harm is going to occur and others intend it [2].
Almost half of individuals with persecutory delusions have
levels of psychological well-being in the lowest 2 % of the
general population [3]. The delusions are typically
accompanied by anxiety [4], depression [5], and disturbed
sleep [6]. A personal account by Weiner [7] notes: ‘What I
remember most is how disoriented and frightened I felt.’ At
first episode of psychosis, over 70 % of patients have a
persecutory delusion [8, 9]. It is the type of delusion most
likely to be acted upon [10]. Persecutory delusions are a
common, clinically important, psychotic experience, for
which treatments need to be significantly improved. We
advocate the approach of understanding the causes to
translate this knowledge into efficacious treatment [11].
Increasingly it is being recognised that persecutory
delusions are at the extreme end of a paranoia spectrum. It
is another example, more widely accepted for common
mental health problems, of a quantitative trait in the gen-
eral population [12, 13]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, there is an
exponential distribution of paranoid thoughts in the general
population [14, 15]. This distribution of paranoia has even
been found in children [16]. Many people have a few
paranoid thoughts, and a few have many. Paranoia in the
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general population is associated with poorer physical
health, suicidal ideation, and weaker social cohesion [17].
Only recently has the heritability of paranoia in the general
population been estimated. In a study of five thousand
adolescent twin pairs, it was found that 50 % of the vari-
ability in levels of paranoia in the population is due to genes
[18]. Identifying the genes is likely to prove difficult [19],
though of course the heritability estimate indicates that the
environment has an equally important role in the occurrence
of paranoia. Paranoia in adulthood generally decreases
slightly with age, and though there may be content differ-
ences the rates appear similar in men and women [17].
Study of individual psychotic experiences has gained
ground because of the evidence that the main diagnoses of
psychosis, such as schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder,
and delusional disorder, do not capture single disorders.
Despite their longevity of use, the diagnoses may prove an
obstacle in the advancement of the understanding and
treatment of the difficult experiences for which patients
require help. The empirical research indicates that within
these diagnoses are multiple independent experiences, such
as paranoia, hallucinations, grandiosity, thought disorder,
and anhedonia [13, 20–22]. A research approach, particu-
larly adopted by cognitive psychology, has been to try to
explain these single psychotic experiences. We note that
most causes are ‘inus conditions’—‘an insufficient but non-
redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’
[23]. Paranoia arises from a combination of causes, with each
causal factor only increasing the probability of such fears
occurring. This review highlights our perspective on the
established findings, the most promising directions, and key
research questions. The empirical evidence here is synthes-
ised from an updated search continuing on from our three
earlier systematic literature reviews of delusions [24–26].
A worry thinking style
‘… sit and think. Then get paranoider and paranoider
and paranoider and paranoider’ [27]
Worry brings implausible ideas to mind, keeps them
there, and increases the distress that they cause. It is
therefore a plausible factor in the occurrence of paranoid
thinking [28]. The evidence to support this position has
been accumulating. A longitudinal national epidemiologi-
cal survey showed that the presence of worry predicts new
inceptions of paranoid thoughts over 18 months [29].
Worry predicts the persistence of existing non-clinical
paranoia [29, 30]. Those who tend to adopt a worry
thinking style are also more likely to experience paranoia
in an experimental setting [31, 32]. Rates of worry in
patients with persecutory delusions are comparable to those
seen in patients with generalised anxiety disorder [28, 33–
35]. Levels of rumination are also high in patients with
persistent persecutory delusions [36]. An experience sam-
pling study has shown that a period of worry precedes the
occurrence of delusional ideation [37]. Importantly, the
level of worry in patients predicts the persistence of per-
secutory delusions over the following months [5, 38].
These theoretical studies led to two pilot clinical trials
that attempted to reduce levels of worry in patients with
persecutory delusions. The worry interventions address the
tendency to react to troubling thoughts with worry and do
not dispute the content of persecutory delusions. The initial
evidence was encouraging, indicating that reducing worry
may lead to reductions in the delusions [39, 40]. This has
now been rigorously tested by Freeman and colleagues [40]
in the Worry Intervention Trial, the first major randomised
controlled trial specifically for patients with persecutory
delusions. 150 patients with persistent persecutory delu-
sions were randomised to a six session worry reduction
intervention in addition to standard care or to standard care.
Assessments were carried out blind and the follow-up rate
was very high. The CBT for worry intervention led to
significant reductions in worry and the persecutory delu-
sions. Changes in worry mediated the majority of the
change in the delusions. There were also significant
improvements in well-being, and reductions in rumination,
overall psychiatric symptoms and general levels of para-
noia. This is convincing evidence for the importance of a
worry thinking style causing the persistence of persecutory
delusions and the strongest demonstration to date of the
advances in understanding being translated into treatment.
Treatment refinement is likely to benefit from studies that
determine the mechanisms underlying worry in patients
with delusions.
Fig. 1 The distribution of total paranoia scores in the general
population [15]
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Negative thoughts about the self
‘After university, however, I failed to really get a
good start to my career, I was working part time and
living with my parents, I had no clue about what I
really wanted to do, and because I had no money, I
couldn’t go out very much… I began to be under the
impression that I had some sort of social handicap…
Eventually, I was convinced that when I was out on
the street, everyone who saw me instantly knew I had
some sort of social handicap. It actually started to feel
as if everybody who met me pretended to treat me
normally and then laughed at me behind my back
once I’d gone’ [41].
The view encapsulated in the paranoia hierarchy (see
Fig. 2) [14] is that feeling negative about the self can lead
to feelings of being different, apart, inferior and hence
vulnerable. Paranoia is likely to flourish when an individual
perceives him or herself as potentially vulnerable. Two
longitudinal patient studies have shown that negative
thoughts about the self predict the persistence of persecu-
tory delusions [5, 42]. In the largest of these, 301 patients
with psychosis were assessed three times over a year [42].
Structural equation modelling indicated that negative
cognition led to paranoid thinking, with little evidence for
the reverse direction. Three recent systematic reviews
indicate that paranoia is associated directly with negative
self-concepts, without the need to evoke defensive pro-
cesses [26, 43, 44]. Individuals with persecutory delusions
may actually be excessively critical of themselves [45]. A
recent experimental study manipulated self-esteem in
people vulnerable to paranoid thoughts [46]. The
participants entered a virtual social world twice: once at
their normal height, once at a reduced height. Height is
associated with social status, so it was predicted that
reducing height would lead to lower self-esteem. It was
found that reducing height led to more negative thoughts
about the self in relation to others and this explained an
increase in paranoia. Another experimental study has
indicated that a compassion focussed technique reduces the
occurrence of paranoid ideation during recall of a dis-
tressing memory [47].
The evidence for an association of persecutory delusions
with negative self-thoughts is convincing, and is consistent
with broader work showing links of negative emotion to
positive symptoms of psychosis [4] including paranoia [48,
49] and with the ‘social defeat’ hypothesis of schizophrenia
[50]. It may also link to the well-established association of
living in urban areas with a greater rate of psychotic
experiences [51, 52]. In a recent study, we assessed patients
with persecutory delusions on a battery of psychological
processes before and after being randomised to either
entering a busy social urban environment or staying in-
doors [53]. Going outside led to a significant increase in
paranoia, anxiety, depression, negative thoughts about the
self, and fewer positive thoughts about the self. The
increase in paranoia was partially mediated by the increa-
ses in anxiety, depression, and negative thoughts about the
self. This study provides further evidence that negative
affect and related processes lead to an increase in paranoia,
and indicates one route via which urban environments may
have an impact on psychological health.
The findings have been used to develop treatment for the
common problem for patients with persecutory delusions of
going outside into busy places, tested in a recent case series
with fifteen patients [54]. The clear treatment implication
of this work is that reducing negative thoughts about the
self in patients with persecutory delusions will lead to a
lessening of paranoia. In studies that have treated self-
esteem and measured psychotic experiences, a reduction in
delusions and hallucinations has been seen [55, 56]. These
studies have not, however, examined paranoia in particular.
Studies testing clinical techniques to improve negative
beliefs about the self in patients with persecutory delusions
are clearly indicated [57].
Interpersonal sensitivity
‘Yeh, yeh and that’s the thing, I didn’t realise that it
was paranoia but I was terrified that people would
laugh at me or ridicule me or hurt me or trick me in
some way, you know, mind games became an active
part of my perception’ [58]Fig. 2 The paranoia hierarchy [14]
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The exact nature of negative self-cognition in paranoia
remains to be determined. Assuredly, such thoughts will be
related to the anxiety and depression commonly found in
individuals with paranoid ideation. And negative cogni-
tions about the self and others will be one route via which
adverse events lead to paranoia [29, 59, 60]. One promising
more refined specification is interpersonal sensitivity,
defined as ‘feeling vulnerable in the presence of others due
to the expectation of criticism or rejection’ [61]. Paranoid
ideation can be considered as an extension of such con-
cerns. Interpersonal sensitivity was first linked to paranoia
in a series of virtual reality experimental studies [31, 62,
63]. For instance, a study of 200 members of the general
population found that people higher in interpersonal sen-
sitivity were more likely to interpret a neutral virtual reality
social environment as containing hostility from others [31].
Subsequent work has found interpersonal sensitivity to be
high in patients with persecutory delusions [35] and, lat-
terly, in those at high risk of developing psychosis [64].
Interpersonal sensitivity is positively associated with levels
of anxiety and depression [65]. Longitudinal studies of
interpersonal sensitivity have yet to be carried out.
A recent pilot study has provided an initial test of the
effect on persecutory delusions of intervening on inter-
personal sensitivity [61]. Eleven patients with persistent
persecutory delusions and reporting interpersonal sensi-
tivity took part. There was a baseline period of a fortnight,
provision of six sessions of CBT focussed upon reducing
interpersonal sensitivity cognitions, and a 1-month follow-
up. Patients were stable during the baseline period but
following the intervention there were large effect size
reductions in both interpersonal sensitivity and the perse-
cutory delusions which were maintained at the follow-up.
However, assessments were carried out by the therapist,
and there was no control group. Targeting interpersonal
sensitivity in patients with persecutory delusions requires
evaluation in a randomised controlled study. There is scope
for greater precision in the measurement of the concept.
More broadly, a topic needing sustained research is spec-
ification of the negative cognitions central to paranoia,
clarifying whether there are a variety of types of negative
cognitions about the self and others; qualitative surveys
may be of particular help here initially. The most proximal
ideation to paranoia is likely to concern vulnerability,
which may stem from a number of different views about
the self and others.
Anomalous internal experiences
‘It isn’t as much the dark that I’m afraid of now, it’s
the feeling of what may be in the room that I cannot
see. I always feel like someone is there, and is going
to either kidnap, rape, or kill me. Many times when I
am home alone I feel that someone is going to break
in and kill me. I always feel that someone is there’
[66].
In the study of paranoia there is often an emphasis given
to the misinterpretation of external events; in the attribu-
tional literature, this is typically about the occurrence of
outright negative events, such as a friend being hostile [67].
Clinically, the events reported by patients are actually
mostly minor and ambiguous, such as someone bumping
into the person, or the looks on faces, or snippets of
overheard conversations. However, it is often under-
appreciated that these events are common in the environ-
ment and are not always noticed or misinterpreted by
patients. An alternative view is that these events only gain
significance when the individual is in a subjectively
unsettled state. The implication is that what is occurring is
actually a misinterpretation of internal anomalous experi-
ence. The person experiences, for example, unexplained
anxious arousal, or feelings of depersonalisation, or has
perceptual disturbances, which go unrecognised and lead to
explanations sought in the external environment. Thus,
external events are fuel for the misinterpretations of the
internal states.
Such anomalous experiences may be triggered by illicit
drugs, poor sleep, and negative life events. There is even
recent evidence that a bout of worry can cause deperson-
alisation in patients with persecutory delusions [68]. There
are many reports of a wide-range of anomalous internal
experiences in patients with psychosis [69–72]. One long-
standing framing of these anomalous states in patients has
been the idea that there are basic self disturbances in
schizophrenia [73], and another that there is aberrant sal-
ience [74]. Those vulnerable to anomalous internal expe-
riences are more likely to experience paranoia in an
experimental setting [75]. The account of delusions arising
from changes in subjective experience is also used to
explain an association of hearing loss and psychotic
experiences [76], which was tested in one of the first
experimental studies of paranoia [77]. The appraisals of the
anomalous experiences contribute to the level of distress
caused [78, 79].
The creation of internal subjective states in experimental
tests of paranoia is rare. A recent study used the intrave-
nous administration of D9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the
principal psychoactive ingredient of cannabis, to test a
causal role for anomalous experiences in paranoia [80]. A
randomised, placebo-controlled test with 121 individuals
from the general population reporting paranoid ideation
showed that administration of THC caused the occurrence
of paranoia, as assessed by virtual reality, self-report, and
semi-structured interview. The THC also caused an
1182 Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol (2014) 49:1179–1189
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increase in anomalous internal experiences and negative
affect and a decrease in working memory performance. It
was the increase in anomalous experience and negative
affect, and not the changes in working memory, that fully
mediated the increase in paranoia. Interestingly, it was not
possible to disentangle the separate contributions of
anomalous experiences and negative emotion, indicating
common connections. Of importance now are studies that
help reduce anomalous internal experiences in patients
with persecutory delusions.
Insomnia
‘I’ve even been too scared while driving to look in
the rear view mirror because I knew I would ‘see’ the
bloke who’s there ready to kill me. I wouldn’t sleep
for hours and hours because I thought as soon as I
closed my eyes there would be someone standing
there when I opened them’ [66].
An area of expansion in the past 5 years has been the
role of sleep disturbance in the occurrence of paranoia.
Indeed, sleep as a causal factor across psychiatric problems
is receiving greater attention [81, 82]. The obvious routes
by which problems sleeping could lead to paranoia are an
increase in negative affect and in the occurrence of subtle
anomalies of experience. The first systematic report on the
issue found high rates of insomnia in patients with perse-
cutory delusions [6]. Subsequent studies found substantial
associations of paranoid ideation with insomnia in the
general population, which were partially mediated by
negative affect [17, 83]. A longitudinal population study
showed that having insomnia increased the odds by
threefold of developing paranoid ideation [29]. Poor sleep
has also been found to be a predictor of the persistence of
existing paranoia [30]. Supporting these ideas of important
causal connections between disturbed sleep and paranoia, a
study of over 5,000 adolescent twin pairs found paranoia
and insomnia to be associated and that there is significant
overlap between the two problems in genetic and envi-
ronmental risk [84].
Given that insomnia is a treatable condition [85, 86],
there is an obvious potential for translation of this theo-
retical knowledge about the contribution of sleep to para-
noia. In the only study to date, 15 patients with persistent
persecutory delusions all received a four-session session
CBT intervention for insomnia [87]. There were large
effect size reductions in both insomnia and the delusions,
which persisted at least 1 month after intervention. How-
ever, this was an unblinded, uncontrolled study. A longer
CBT for insomnia intervention for patients with delusions
and/or hallucinations is now being evaluated in a
randomised controlled clinical trial [88]. Of course if
patients with psychosis have sleep problems then these
should be treated with the available evidence-based inter-
ventions, but the implication is that this will also lessen the
psychotic experiences. Identification of the factors, both
proximal and distal, leading to chronic sleep problems in
patients with delusions would be beneficial for treatment
development.
Reasoning
‘When I see people laughing and talking about me I
try thinking that I’m jumping to conclusions. When I
see people with mobiles I’ve been trying to give them
the benefit of the doubt—they might be taking pic-
tures of me, but they might not. It’s less distressing
thinking like this…’ [89]
One of the most replicated findings is the presence of
‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) being more common in
patients with delusions than in non-clinical populations
[90–92]. These studies have typically contained a majority
of patients with persecutory delusions, so we can be con-
fident that the bias is present in this delusion subtype
although rates of JTC may be even higher in patients with
grandiose delusions [93]. Jumping to conclusions, reaching
certainty after limited data gathering, is considered to lead
to the rapid acceptance of delusional ideas. Jumping to
conclusions is associated with lower working memory
capacity [94, 95], but not higher levels of need for closure
[96] or intolerance of uncertainty [95]. It is present in high
conviction delusional beliefs but not in high conviction
anxiety beliefs [97]. In clinical groups the presence of the
bias does not seem to be affected by anxiety manipulations
[68, 98].
Standard assessments of JTC do not examine the type of
data gathered. However, the gathering of data is highly
likely to be influenced by the well-established belief con-
firmation bias [99], or a bias against disconfirmatory evi-
dence [100]. Once data are gathered, the influence of
experiential and analytic reasoning may be important. In
the general population, higher levels of paranoia are
associated with less use of analytic reasoning [101, 102].
Individuals with persecutory delusions report less use of
both experiential and rational reasoning styles [102]. JTC,
belief confirmation, and less use of analytic reasoning are
all likely to lead not only to a strongly held delusional
belief but the failure to consider alternative explanations. A
failure to consider alternative explanations [103], resis-
tance to hypothetical contradiction [10], and an unwill-
ingness to consider the possibility of being mistaken [10]
are all considered as markers of ‘belief inflexibility’ [104].
Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol (2014) 49:1179–1189 1183
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Belief inflexibility is the reasoning process most associated
with degree of conviction in delusions [105].
Attention has turned towards how this knowledge of
reasoning processes in delusions can be translated into
treatment. A randomised controlled trial with 154 patients
with paranoia showed that a novel educational approach
(metacognitive training, MCT), providing information and
exercises about a number of cognitive biases found in
psychosis, given within groups over eight sessions, did not
have an impact on delusions [106]. A similar-sized trial
suggested that MCT had benefits for patients without
severe clinical delusions, i.e. with mild to moderate levels
of delusional ideation [107]. These have been the two most
rigorous, well-powered tests of this group reasoning edu-
cational programme, showing contrasting results. Building
on this innovative work, our approach in working with
people with high conviction delusions has been first to
demonstrate in experimental studies short-term change in
the reasoning biases [89, 108]. In a recent study, 101
patients with current delusions were randomised to a
90-min individually delivered reasoning intervention or to
an attention control condition [109]. There were homework
exercises over the following fortnight for patients receiving
the intervention. The brief reasoning training led to sig-
nificant reductions in state paranoia and improvements in
reasoning: reduced JTC and increased belief flexibility.
There was evidence that the increases in belief flexibility
partially mediated a significant reduction in current levels
of paranoia in the patients at the 2-week assessment. The
study demonstrates that it is possible, at least in the short-
term, to help people adjust their reasoning styles, and that
this leads to change in paranoia. Belief flexibility is
therefore a promising reasoning target. The next step is the
development and evaluation of a longer, eight session
clinical intervention aiming to achieve effective flexibility
in thinking and consequent sustained change in the delu-
sion; this is a key area for future research. Overall, the
findings in our review indicate the importance of affective
processes, anomalous experiences, and reasoning in the
occurrence of severe paranoia (see Fig. 3).
Other paths
Perhaps the most researched psychological process in
schizophrenia research has been theory of mind [110],
since almost by definition the intentions of others are being
misread in the content of paranoid thoughts. There is strong
evidence for theory of mind difficulties being present in
patients with schizophrenia [111, 112]; however, it is clear
that these cognitive difficulties are most associated with
negative symptoms and not paranoia [25, 26, 113]. In our
recent review, in 38 clinical studies of theory of mind, the
majority did not find associations with delusions in general
or paranoia [26]. In three non-clinical studies there was no
association of theory of mind performance and paranoia. A
recent study with patients with an early episode of psy-
chosis and non-clinical controls found no association of a
dimensional paranoia measure with theory of mind per-
formance in either group [114]. Overall, this is unsurpris-
ing. It is known that theory of mind problems is closely
Fig. 3 Outline of factors involved in delusion formation [31]
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linked to cognitive neuropsychological impairments [115,
116] and that such cognitive impairments are linked with
the negative rather than the positive symptoms of psychosis
such as delusions [117]—the theory of mind results in
schizophrenia is consistent with this pattern. Furthermore,
an interesting analysis of patient conversations found the-
ory of mind skills to be intact [118]. Our view is that in
clinical settings it is possible that theory of mind difficul-
ties is present in some patients, that when present they
could exacerbate paranoid thinking, but such problems are
not a key causal factor.
A topic that has gained attention but received less direct
empirical scrutiny has been the hypothesis of two distinct
types of paranoia: ‘Poor me’ and ‘bad me’ [119]. In the
former paranoia is considered a defence against negative
emotions reaching consciousness and in the latter paranoia
is considered a direct reflection of conscious ideas about
the self that are so extremely negative that the person
believes they will be punished. In clinical populations
‘Poor Me’ presentations are substantially more common
than ‘Bad Me’ [120–122]. The plausibility of there being
two distinct types of paranoia with opposite causes is de-
bateable; indeed, analysis of an epidemiological national
survey indicates there to be just a single underlying para-
noia dimension [15]. Importantly, the central test of the two
subtypes of hypothesis has not been carried out: an
examination of defence processes in each of the two types.
Given that the Poor Me subtype is substantially more
common, it is therefore notable that the evidence is gen-
erally inconsistent with a defence account of persecutory
delusions: hypothesised defences are hard to test but the
largest studies [123, 124] do not find defensive processing
present; defensive processing has not even been found for
the more obviously self-enhancing grandiose delusions
[125]; while systematic literature reviews have all reported
a strong direct relationship between negative emotion and
delusions [26, 43, 44] which would not be predicted by a
defence account. Even the presence of a hypothesised
defensive externalising attributional style in individuals
with persecutory delusions is a topic of debate [67]. Par-
simonious explanations of negative emotion and paranoia
do not need to evoke defences. In our view, the Poor Me/
Bad Me theory has helpfully highlighted one neglected
aspect of the content of paranoia, i.e. people may feel they
deserve to be harmed, and this is a cognition closely linked
to levels of depression. As depression fluctuates so will the
ideas about deserving harm, as has been reported [126];
this does not, however, indicate distinct categories. There
are other aspects of the content of delusions (e.g. the
individual’s perceived degree of control over the situation,
ideas about the power of the persecutor) [1] that may also
be important in determining or be determined by emotional
responses, and, equally, if dichotomised would likely lead
to differences in presentation, but this would not indicate
discrete subtypes. We endorse the value of identifying
emotional correlates of paranoia, but see no convincing
empirical evidence of distinct paranoia subtypes, and,
indeed, there is evidence against such a view.
New routes
We have focussed the review upon areas which have
received, to some degree, repeated empirical scrutiny.
There is, however, much that remains to be investigated in
this important area both for individuals’ psychological
health and the understanding of the broader issue of social
cohesion. Extension of the work into developmental studies
of mistrust in children would be especially valuable [16,
127]. This could be linked to the understanding of the
metacognitive beliefs that support the adoption of paranoid
beliefs [128]. There is initial promising work to take for-
ward examining paranoia in relation to stress [129–131]
and emotion regulation difficulties [132, 133]. There are
interesting connections between PTSD and paranoia [30,
134, 135] and related innovations in the treatment of psy-
chosis [136]. There is much research relating childhood
trauma and abuse to psychosis; while trauma, especially
sexual abuse, has been linked to hallucinations, some
recently emerging evidence links childhood neglect (such
as being placed in care) specifically to paranoia [60, 137].
The precise role of imagery in paranoid fears is yet to be
determined [138, 139]. How paranoia affects social func-
tioning [140, 141], what leads to acting on delusions [142],
and what are the societal factors that increase paranoia
[143] are important topics for future research. Much of our
work has been inspired by listening to patients and trying
out strategies during psychological therapy, as indicated in
the personal accounts used throughout this review. Sys-
tematic investigations of patients’ views are likely to be
very informative [27, 144]. How paranoia differs in causal
factors from anxiety, depression, grandiosity and other
related psychological problems remains to be determined
[75, 93]. It is notable that the specific neurobiology of
delusions and related processing has been neglected [145],
while there needs to be a concerted effort to determine the
effects at the individual level on psychological processing
of known social factors increasing paranoia. Given the
clear evidence of advancements in understanding, arguably
the greatest focus needs to be on translation into more
efficacious treatments and self-management. In this work,
the potential benefits of incorporating self-help [146] and
technological innovations such as mobile phones [147],
experience sampling methodology [148] and virtual reality
[149] remains to be determined. In the future, we hope to
see many more robust treatment trials focussed specifically
upon patients reporting persecutory delusions.
Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol (2014) 49:1179–1189 1185
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